We have formalized the functional speci cation of HMAC-DRBG (NIST 800-90A), and we have proved its cryptographic securitythat its output is pseudorandom-using a hybrid game-based proof. We have also proved that the mbedTLS implementation (C program) correctly implements this functional speci cation. That proof composes with an existing C compiler correctness proof to guarantee, end-to-end, that the machine language program gives strong pseudorandomness. All proofs (hybrid games, C program veri cation, compiler, and their composition) are machine-checked in the Coq proof assistant. Our proofs are modular: the hybrid game proof holds on any implementation of HMAC-DRBG that satis es our functional speci cation. Therefore, our functional speci cation can serve as a high-assurance reference.
INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic systems require large amounts of randomness to generate keys, nonces and initialization vectors. Because many computers lack the large amount of high-quality physical randomness needed to generate these values, most cryptographic devices rely on pseudorandom generators (also known as deterministic random bit generators or DRBGs) to "stretch" small amounts of true randomness into large amounts of pseudorandom output. 1 Pseudorandom generators are crucial to security. Compromising a generator (for example, by selecting malicious algorithm constants, or ex ltrating generator state) can harm the security of nearly any cryptosystem built on top of it. The harm can be catastrophic: for example, an adversary who can predict future outputs of the generator may be able to predict private keys that will be generated, or recover long term keys used as input to the protocol execution. 1 A note on terminology: we use "entropy" loosely to denote randomness that is not predictable by an adversary. We use "sampled uniformly at random" and "ideally random" interchangeably. We use PRG, the acronym for "pseudo-random generator, " to refer to the abstract cryptographic concept, whereas we use DRBG, the acronym for "deterministic random bit generator, " to denote the speci cations and implementations of PRGs. Instead of DRBG, some papers use "PRNG, " the acronym for "pseudo-random number generator. " The terms are synonymous. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. CCS '17, Oct. 30-Nov. 3, 2017 , Dallas, TX, USA. © 2017 ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-4946-8/17/10. . . $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3133974 Moreover, it may be impossible to test that a DRBG has been compromised if one is limited to black-box testing. Current validation standards [26, 30, 32] primarily resort to statistical tests and test vectors, neither of which guarantee that the output is pseudorandom. One can even construct backdoored PRGs that cannot be detected by black-box testing [18] .
Despite the importance of DRBGs, their development has not received the scrutiny it deserves. Many catastrophic aws in DRBGs have been uncovered at both the design level and the implementation level. Some bugs arise from simple programming mistakes. The Debian DRBG, though open-source, was broken for two years because a line of code was erroneously removed, weakening the DRBG's seeding process [29] . Several recent projects have identied and factored large numbers of weak RSA keys produced due to improper generator seeding [12, 23, 28] . A bug in entropy use in the Android DRBG resulted in the theft of $5,700 of Bitcoin [22] .
While those aws were accidental, some are malicious. Adversaries intentionally target DRBGs because breaking a DRBG is an easy way to break the larger cryptosystem. The most notorious example is the NSA's alleged backdooring of the Dual EC DRBG standard [6, 13, 33, 36] . In the Dual EC design, the malicious choice of a single algorithm parameter (an elliptic curve point Q) allows for full state recovery of the DRBG given only a small amount of raw generator output. This enables the passive decryption of protocols such as TLS and IPSEC/IKE [15, 16, 36] . From 2012 to 2015 this backdoor was exploited by unauthorized parties to insert a passive decryption backdoor into Juniper NetScreen VPN devices [15, 39] . Remarkably, a related DRBG aw in Fortinet VPNs created a similar vulnerability in those devices during the same time period [25] .
A key weakness in the deployment of DRBGs is that current government standards both encourage speci c designs and lack rigor. The FIPS validation process (required by the U.S. government for certain types of cryptographic device) mandates the use of an "approved" NIST DRBG in every cryptographic module. As a consequence, a small number of DRBG designs have become ubiquitous throughout the industry. These algorithms lack formal security proofs, and their design processes were neither open nor rigorous-in fact, the designs were found to include errors. Even worse, it is easy to implement certain of these DRBGs such that the output of the generator is predictable (given detailed knowledge of the implementation), and yet without this knowledge the output of the generator is computationally indistinguishable from random [18] . Unfortunately, the existing formal validation processes for verifying the correctness of DRBG implementations are weak and routinely ignore entire classes of aws. Given that the widespread deployment of a weak DRBG can undermine the security of entire computer networks, we need a better way to validate these critical systems.
Contributions
DRBGs have the special property that testing, even sophisticated statistical fuzz-testing, cannot assure the security of an implementation. Even at the level of a pure cryptographic protocol, proving the security of a DRBG construction can be quite challenging. (Hybridgame-based proofs are the only known technique, but for nontrivial DRBGs those proofs have so many technical steps that it is hard to trust them.) Therefore a new paradigm is required, in which the functional model of a DRBG is proved with a machine-checked proof to satisfy the appropriate PRF properties, and the C language implementation (and its compilation to machine language) is proved with a machine-checked proof to correctly implement the functional model, and these proofs are linked together in the same proof-checker.
We present machine-checked proofs, in Coq, of many components, connected and checked at their speci cation interfaces so that we get a truly end-to-end result: Verson 2.1.1 of the mbedTLS HMAC-DRBG correctly implements the NIST 800-90A standard, and HMAC-DRBG Generate and Update as described in that same NIST 800-90A standard indeed produces pseudorandom output, subject to the standard assumptions 2 about SHA-2, as well as certain assumptions about the adversary and the HMAC-DRBG instantiation that we state formally and explicitly. We have not proved the security of Instantiate (see §7) and Reseed.
To prove this theorem, we took the following steps.
(1) We constructed a proof that the version of HMAC-DRBG described in the standard NIST SP 800-90A generates pseudorandom output, assuming that HMAC is a pseudorandom function and that the DRBG's state is instantiated with ideal randomness. Our proof is similar to that of Hirose [24] , but more clearly and explicitly structured. By "pseudorandom," we mean that a nonadaptive 3 probabilistic polynomial-time adversary that requests the maximum amount of output from HMAC-DRBG cannot distinguish its output from uniformly random output with nonnegligible probability. (2) We mechanized the proof in (1), formalizing the cryptographic algorithm ("crypto spec") and the security theorem in Coq, instantiating HMAC as HMAC/SHA-256, and assuming that the DRBG's initial state is ideally random. Our crypto spec was written with respect to the NIST standard SP 800-90A [6] which de nes HMAC-DRBG. It was written in the probabilistic programming language provided by the Foundational Cryptography Framework [35] , which is itself embedded in the Coq proof assistant. (3) We proved that the mbedTLS implementation of HMAC-DRBG (written in C) correctly implements a functional speci cation, also derived from SP 800-90A, written as a pure function in Coq. We performed the veri cation using the Veri ed Software Toolchain (VST) framework [5] , which is also embedded in the Coq proof assistant.
(4) We proved that our two functional specs for HMAC-DRBG (both derived from SP 800-90A) are equivalent, by induction in Coq. This connects the C-program correctness proof to the cryptographic pseudorandomness proof. (5) Beringer et al. [11] and Appel [4] proved that an OpenSSL implementation of HMAC with SHA-256 implements the FIPS-198 and FIPS-180 functional specs (respectively), and those in turn implement a PRF with bounded attacker advantage, subject to some standard (unproven but uncontroversial) assumptions about the security of SHA-256's compression function.
Composing these proofs (which we do in the Coq proof assistant without any gaps at the interfaces) yields our main result. This modular approach allows one to incrementally verify even complex cryptographic protocol implementations in real languages.
The trusted base. Appel [4, §12] discusses at length the trusted code base of this approach. In summary: the mbedTLS DRBG program need not be trusted, as it is proved to implement the spec; the compiler need not be trusted, as it is proved correct; the NIST spec (or our formalization of it) need not be trusted, because it is proved to be a PRF. FCF need not be trusted, because it is proved sound in Coq (only the de nitions used in the statement of the PRF theorem need be trusted, because if you prove the wrong theorem it's not so useful). VST need not be trusted, because it is proved sound w.r.t. the operational semantics of CompCert C. The CompCert veri ed optimizing C compiler need not be trusted, because it is proved correct w.r.t. that same operational semantics and the op. sem. of the assembly language. The op. sem. speci cation of CompCert's source language (C) need not be trusted, because it's just an internal interface of the proof (between VST and CompCert). What must be trusted are: the speci cation of the assembly language ISA (as an operational-semantic statement in Coq); the statement of the main theorem and the de nitions it relies on (one must make sure that the right property is proved); and the Coq kernel (proof checker), along with the OCaml compiler that compiled Coq, and the OCaml compiler that compiled the OCaml compiler (it's turtles all the way down [38] ). One could also compile mbedTLS with gcc or clang, and in that case the compiler would be part of the TCB.
Our DRBG proof is for mbedTLS, and our HMAC proof is for OpenSSL, so technically our end-to-end proof is for an implementation with those two components stapled together.
We prove "only" functional correctness, which has useful corollaries of safety and direct information ow: no bu er overruns, no reading from or writing to unspeci ed locations. We do not address side channels-which are not a functional-correctness propertybut because we verify standard C-language implementations, any other analysis tools for side channels in C programs can be applied. Closer to machine code, our approach is compatible with Barthe et al.'s methodology of combining functional and implementational correctness proofs with formal proofs of leakage security, based on a noninterference analysis for CompCert's low-level intermediate language Mach [7] .
Coq proofs. For the functional speci cation, cryptographic speci cation, proof of functional correctness, and security proof, see github.com/PrincetonUniversity/VST/tree/master/hmacdrbg.
The README le in that directory explains how the Coq les correspond to sections of this paper.
Prior work
Hirose [24] proves the pseudorandomness of the full HMAC-DRBG on paper, also with respect to a nonadaptive adversary. However, the proof is not linked to any implementation of HMAC-DRBG. Moreover, though it is well-written, the six-page Hirose proof is challenging to read and verify. For example, Hirose justi es his arguments informally; several times, he states that an important implication is "easy to see" or that it "directly follows from the preceding lemmas. " Hirose also asserts that HMAC-DRBG is secure when the user provides an optional additional input on initialization; however, he only states the relevant lemmas without proving them. We do not prove any properties relating to additional input.
To perform proofs more readably and rigorously on complex constructions such as DRBG, we harness the power of mechanization. We mechanize our proof in the Coq proof assistant, using the embedded Foundational Cryptography Framework (FCF). In contrast to working on paper, mechanizing a proof requires that all lemmas and relationships between lemmas be precisely stated. Additionally, FCF encourages proofs to be done in the game-playing style, which makes the intermediate de nitions more explicit (because they must all be written as code) and the proof as a whole easier to read and verify. See §4.4 for an outline of the structure of our proof.
More speci cally, the Coq proof assistant assists the user by providing an interactive development environment and user-programmable automation to construct a formal syntactic proof. Then, the Coq kernel checks that this term proves the stated theorem. Coq has been used to prove mathematical theorems, cryptographic theorems, C program correctness, and C compiler correctness. The latter three are relevant to our work.
A eldt et al. [1] present an end-to-end machine-checked (in Coq) proof of the Blum-Blum-Shub PRG, proving cryptographic security of the algorithm and correctness of the implementation. They mechanize an existing, well-known proof of BBS's security. Their cryptographic games are linked directly to their own assembly code, whereas our games apply to a high-level speci cation of the DRBG in question, and connect to a widely used C program. BBS is not used in practice because it is quite slow [37] .
Appel [4] proved in Coq that OpenSSL SHA-256 correctly implements the FIPS-180 speci cation. Beringer et al. [11] proved in Coq the PRF security of the FIPS-198 speci cation of HMAC/SHA-256, and that the OpenSSL implementation of HMAC correctly implements FIPS-198.
Petcher [34] applies mechanization to demonstrate a negative example, rather than a positive one. He demonstrates how the process of mechanizing the proof of security of Dual-EC-DRBG naturally results in an unprovable theorem, which reveals the weakness in the DRBG's design. Our mechanized proof of HMAC-DRBG shows which parts have no aws (Generate and Update), and which are problematic (Instantiate).
Inspired by the Android bug described earlier, the Entroscope tool [20] uses information ow and static analysis (with bounded model checking) to detect entropy loss in the seeding of a PRNG. Entroscope has been successfully applied to nd a bug in the Libgcrypt PRNG, and would have detected the Debian incident [29] .
Higher-level protocols such as TLS have been proved secure with machine-checked proofs [14] , although without proving security of primitives such as DRBGs or HMAC. Our work complements such proofs.
No prior work has proved full cryptographic security and correctness of a DRBG that links all of its components: a speci cation on paper, a proof of security on paper, a widely used implementation, and its correct compilation to assembly code. The DRBG aws listed earlier demonstrate that a DRBG may contain aws anywhere (and everywhere!) in that stack. Thus, it is imperative to verify DRBGs, and cryptographic primitives in general, in a manner that links all of their components.
DETERMINISTIC RANDOM BIT GENERATORS
In 2007 the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released Special Publication 800-90 describing several pseudorandom generator constructions, replaced in 2012 by 800-90A [6] . Termed deterministic random bit generators in NIST's parlance, these generators have been widely adopted in many commercial products, including many operating systems and TLS libraries. This adoption is largely because SP800-90A generators are required in modules validated by the U.S. government's Cryptographic Module Validation Program [32] . The NIST speci cation describes a speci c algorithmic interface as well as an informal list of security goals. We present this below.
De nition 2.1. A DRBG is a tuple of algorithms (Instantiate, Update, Reseed, Generate) with the following interface.
Instantiate(entrop , nonce). On input of an initial entropy string and a personalization nonce, outputs the initial state k, . Update(data, k, ). On input of (optional) data string (for seeding) and a generator state k, , outputs a new state k , . Reseed( k, , entrop ). On input of the current generator state and an entropy string, output a new state k , . Generate( k, , n). On input of the current generator state and a number of blocks n, output a string of pseudorandom output as well as a new state k, .
The NIST standard informally describes several security properties that a DRBG must possess. These include the standard notion of pseudorandomness, as well as several auxiliary properties. In this work we focus primarily on the pseudorandomness property. De nition 2.2 (Pseudorandomness of the DRBG). Let Π = (Instantiate, Update, Reseed, Generate) be a DRBG, let c denote the length of the internal state vector, and let the random variable PR b (Π, A, λ) where b ∈ {0, 1}, and λ ∈ N denote the result of the following probabilistic experiment:
Output B where O Generate (b, n) de nes an oracle that is initialized with initial state (k, ) and if b = 0 runs the Generate algorithm using the internal state and then updates the internal state. The security parameter λ is the number of entropy bits seeding the DRBG. If b = 1, the oracle samples a uniformly random string of length nc (where c is the block length) and returns this to A. A DRBG scheme Π is pseudorandom if ∀ p.p.t. algorithms A the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
In this work we will focus primarily on the Generate and Update algorithms, while leaving analysis of the Instantiate algorithm for future analysis (we discuss the reasons in Section 7). Thus in the remainder of this work we will employ the simplifying assumption that the initial state (k, ) is uniformly random.
HMAC-DRBG
HMAC-DRBG is one of the four pseudorandom generator constructions formalized in NIST SP 800-90A. It works by iterating HMAC, a keyed-hash message authentication function that can be instantiated using a cryptographic hash function such as SHA. HMAC is useful in constructing a PRG. When instantiated with an e cient cryptographic hash function it is highly e cient. Bellare [9, §5] shows that HMAC is a pseudorandom function if certain assumptions hold on the hash functions's internal compression function.
HMAC-DRBG has an internal state consisting of two pieces of administrative information, which are constant across calls, and two pieces of secret information, which are updated during each call to the PRG. The administrative component of the state contains the security strength of the PRG's instantiation, for which the Instantiate function obtains the appropriate amount of entropy for that security strength, and a ag that indicates whether this instantiation requires prediction resistance.
The secret component of the internal state is the working state (k, ), where k is a secret key of length c for the internal PRF (e.g., HMAC). Each time the PRG generates a string of pseudorandom bits (by calling the Generate function), k is updated at least once. The component holds the newest "block" of pseudorandom bits that the PRG has generated. The length of is the length of HMAC's output, which is xed (e.g., 256 bits).
Here we will rephrase the NIST standard in a mostly functional style that closely mirrors our speci cation in Coq. Let f denote HMAC and f k denote HMAC partially applied with the key k. Let || denote concatenation.
Update refreshes (k, ), optionally using some data, which can be fresh entropy for prediction resistance.
Instantiate initializes (k, ) and reseed_counter. For simplicity, we omit the additional_input and personalization_string parameters from Instantiate the "crypto spec" that we present here; these optional parameters allow for the provision of additional entropy to the instantiate call. Our proof of the mbedTLS C code (see §6) does handle these parameters. The omitted parameters are generally used for fork-safety, so therefore we have not proved fork-safety.
Reseed could be called for two reasons. First, reseed_counter may have exceeded reseed_interval. This is rare, since reseed_interval is set to high values in practice; its maximum value is 2 48 , meaning it would naturally reseed once every couple of million years. (Indeed, in practice, one does not want a PRG to reseed often. This would give an attacker more opportunities to compromise the entropy source.) More commonly, Reseed is called when a PRG's state could have been compromised, and requires fresh entropy to be mixed in.
From the user's point of view, only the Instantiate and Generate functions are visible. The state is hidden. Typical usage consists of a call to Instantiate, followed by any number of calls to Generate to produce pseudorandom bits. Generate automatically calls Update every time it is called, and Generate may force a call to Reseed.
OVERVIEW OF THE PROOF
Here we explain the techniques used in our proof. Section 4 presents the mechanized proof in detail.
Key result: HMAC-DRBG is pseudorandom
We prove the pseudorandomness property of HMAC-DRBG. As with traditional proofs, we show the computational indistinguishability of two main "experiments. " In the rst (or "real") experiment, which roughly corresponds to the experiment PR 0 in §2, the adversary interacts with an oracle whose generator uses HMAC-DRBG. In the second (or "ideal") experiment, the adversary interacts with an oracle that produces uniformly random output. This corresponds to PR 1 . Our goal is to connect these experiments via a series of intermediate "hybrid" experiments, which we will use to show that the real and ideal experiments are computationally indistinguishable by any probabilistic polynomial time (p.p.t.) adversary.
The real experiment (G real ). In this experiment, a p.p.t. adversary A makes a sequence of calls to an oracle that implements the Generate function of DRBG. At the start of the experiment, the generator is seeded with a uniformly random generator state k, , and at each call the adversary requests a xed number n of blocks of generator output, where n is chosen in advance. The oracle returns the requested output, then updates its internal state as required by the Generate algorithm. At the conclusion of the experiment, the adversary produces an output bit b. The ideal experiment (G ideal ). The adversary A interacts with an oracle according to the same interface as in the previous experiment. However, this oracle simply returns a uniformly random string of length n blocks. The oracle maintains no internal state. At the conclusion of the experiment, the adversary produces an output bit b.
Stated informally, the probability that A outputs 1 when interacting with G real , minus the probability that the adversary outputs 1 when interacting with G ideal , is a measure of how successful A is in distinguishing the pseudorandom generator from a random generator. Our goal is to bound this quantity to be at most a negligible function of the generator's security parameter (see §5). Our proof connects the real and ideal experiments by de ning a series of intermediate, or hybrid, experiments. These hybrid experiments comprise a transition between the real and ideal experiments. We show that for each successive pair of hybrids-beginning with the real experiment and ending with the ideal experiment-the distribution of the adversary's output must be at most negligibly di erent between the two experiments in the pair. Having performed this task for each pair of experiments leading from real to ideal, we then apply a standard hybrid argument to prove that if all intermediate hybrids satisfy our condition, then the real and ideal experiments themselves must also be computationally indistinguishable. It remains now to outline our hybrids.
Overview of the hybrids. Recall that the HMAC-DRBG generation procedure consists of an iterated construction with two main stages. Given a uniformly random internal state (k, 0 ) the rst phase of generation operates as follows: a call to the Generate function produces a sequence of output blocks which are calculated by applying the HMAC function f k ( 0 ) to generate a block of output 1 , and then applying f k ( 1 ) to obtain 2 and so on until n blocks have been generated. The second phase of Generate updates the internal state of the generator to produce a new state (k , 0 ) which will be used in the subsequent call to Generate.
Our proof de nes a set of hybrids that shows that at each call to Generate, given integer n (whose size is polynomial in λ, the number of entropy bits) and a uniformly random initial state (k, 0 ), the output of Generate(k, , n) is indistinguishable from a random string. Using these hybrids, we show that the PRG, over all calls to Generate, is secure for any xed number of calls numCalls made by the adversary.
We de ne the following sequence of hybrids: G real . This is the real experiment in which all calls are answered using the HMAC-DRBG Generate algorithm.
we modify the experiment such that the rst i calls are replaced with a function that simply returns ideally random bits and a new uniformly random state (k , 0 ) when queried on any input. Internally this is achieved using two additional hybrids: (1) Internal hybrid 1. In this hybrid, the rst i − 1 oracle calls produce random output. In call i we modify the output to sample a random function r and use r in place of the PRF f to compute the Generate algorithm. (2) Internal hybrid 2. Identical to the previous hybrid, except that we substitute each output of the random function with a string of uniformly random bits. G ideal . This is the ideal experiment.
In the rst hybrid, we replace the HMAC function f with a random function r . We are able to show that this replacement does not a ect A's output if f is pseudorandom, as this would imply the existence of a distinguisher for the pseudorandom function, a fact which would directly contradict our assumption. With this replacement complete, hybrid (2) requires us to make speci c arguments about the input to the random function r , namely that the inputs to the random function do not collide. Thus, the core of our proof is a sequence of theorems arguing that, from the perspective of A, the changes we make at each of the intermediate hybrids described above induces only a negligible di erence in A's output. We conclude then by making a standard hybrid argument that bounds the overall distance of G real and G ideal to be negligible in λ. We calculate a concrete bound on A's ability to distinguish between G real and G real .
MECHANIZED SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we describe our machine-checked proof of HMAC-DRBG's pseudorandomness. All de nitions and theorem statements are taken straight from the Coq proofs and may be looked up by name in the le. See the end of §1.1 for the link to our repository.
Foundational Cryptography Framework
Our proof uses the Foundational Cryptography Framework [35] , a Coq library for reasoning about the security of cryptographic schemes. FCF provides a probabilistic programming language for describing cryptographic constructions, security de nitions, and assumed-hard problems. Probabilistic programs are described using Gallina, the purely functional programming language of Coq, extended with a computational monad that adds uniform sampling on bit vectors. In this language, {0,1}^n describes uniform sampling on bit vectors of length n, and monadic arrows (e.g. <-$) sequence the operations. Comp A is the type of probabilistic computations that return values of type A, and a denotational semantics relates every Comp A with a probability distribution on A.
FCF provides a theory of probability distributions, a program logic, and a library of reusable arguments and tactics that can be used to complete proofs. All of these items are based on theory derived from the semantics of probabilistic programs, and the result is a versatile proof framework with a small foundation. For example, FCF includes a reusable hybrid argument on lists that can be used in proofs like one described in this paper. FCF also provides a standard type and associated theory for an adversary that is allowed to interact with an oracle (called OracleComp).
Cryptographic speci cation
At a high level, any DRBG in the NIST speci cation takes as input an initial state (k, ) and a list of natural numbers, where each number is the number of blocks (bitvectors) requested for that call, e.g. [1, 3, 2] . It returns a list of lists of bitvectors with the correct number of generated blocks in each list, e.g. queried with [1, 3, 2] , our model of the DRBG would return
where each b i 's size is the output size of the PRF used in the DRBG. Because we model a nonadaptive adversary, there is only this one round of query-response.
DRBG algorithm de nitions. We begin by de ning the abstract PRG used in our mechanized proof of pseudorandomness. Let f be an arbitrary PRF that takes a key bitvector, an input list, and returns an output bitvector. η is the output size of the PRF, Bvector η is the type of bitvectors of size η (also called "blocks"), and KV is a type synonym for the PRG's internal state, which is a tuple consisting of two blocks (k, ). The function Gen_loop corresponds to the main loop of HMAC-DRBG's Generate function. Given an internal state (k, ) and a number of requested blocks n, it returns a list of generated blocks, along with the last generated block, which becomes the new in the internal state. NIST speci es that at the end of a call to Generate, Update is immediately called to refresh the internal state. In our Coq de nition, we have inlined Update into Generate: The NIST spec allows n to be any number of bits (up to a speci ed maximum), by discarding extra generated bits up to a multiple of the HMAC block size. Our security theorem measures n in blocks, not bits; it would be straightforward to extend the theorem to account for discarding surplus bits. Generate and Instantiate comprise our de nition of the PRG.
The adversary A is given the output of the PRG, which is a list of lists of blocks. It may perform a probabilistic computation on that input, and it returns a boolean guess attempting to distinguish the PRG's output from ideally random output. A is nonadaptive; it is given the output all at once and cannot further query the PRG. Assumptions. We assume that there is a nonzero number of calls numCalls to Generate. We assume that on each call, the adversary requests the same nonzero number of blocks blocksPerCall. This request list is called requestList. Using the de nitions of the PRG's functions and of the adversary, we de ne the real-world game G real that simulates use of the PRG. First, the internal state of the PRG is instantiated. Then the Generate function is iterated over the request list using the function oracleMap, which tracks the PRG's internal state (k, ) and updates it after each iteration. The resulting list of lists of blocks is passed to the adversary, which returns a boolean guess. The ideal-world game G ideal simply generates a list of lists of ideally random blocks, where each sublist is the same length as the corresponding one in the output generated by the PRG. Here, compMap maps a probabilistic function over a list.
Definition G_ideal : Comp bool := bits <-$ compMap Generate_rb requestList; A bits.
Formal statement of theorem
Our main theorem states that the probability that an adversary can distinguish between the real-world game G real and the ideal-world game G ideal is bounded by a negligible quantity. This quantity is the number of calls numCalls to the PRG multiplied by a constant upper bound on the di erence between adjacent hybrids, which is the sum of (1) an upper bound on the PRF advantage for HMAC, and (2) an upper bound on the probability of collisions in a list of length blocksPerCall of Bvector η that are each sampled uniformly at random.
For quantity (1), the PRF advantage of a function f is informally de ned to be the maximum probability that any p.p.t. adversary can distinguish f from a PRF. Since a PRF's advantage is de ned over all p.p.t. PRF adversaries, we construct a PRF adversary that takes an oracle as input (denoted by OracleComp in its type), runs the PRG using that oracle, and returns the PRG adversary A's guess. Technically, PRF_Adversary de nes a family of adversaries parametrized by i, the index of the hybrid. There is actually a di erent PRF advantage for each hybrid i.
Definition PRF_Adversary (i : nat) :
OracleComp Blist (Bvector eta) bool := bits <--$ oracleCompMap_outer (Oi_oc i) requestList; $ A bits.
The rationale behind this de nition of PRF_Adversary will be given in the discussion of lemma Gi_prf_rf_close in Section 4.4. Now we can use the de nition of PRF_Adversary, along with the PRF f , to de ne PRF_Advantage_Game i, which is the PRF advantage for hybrid i (again discussed further in Gi_prf_rf_close). Finally, we de ne the upper bound on f 's PRF advantage to be the maximum (taken over i) of the PRF advantages of hybrid i.
Definition PRF_Advantage_Max := PRF_Advantage_Game (argMax PRF_Advantage_Game numCalls).
If f is instantiated with HMAC, then PRF _Ad anta e_Max can be instantiated with the bound on the PRF advantage of HMAC derived in [11] , modulo some technical details of instantiating the PRF _Ad ersar between the two de nitions.
Quantity (2) in the theorem statement is the upper bound on the probability of collisions in a list of length blocksPerCall of Bvector η that are each sampled uniformly at random. This arises from bounding the probability of the "bad event" in intermediate hybrids, the probability of collisions in the inputs to a random function as used in that intermediate hybrid.
Proof that HMAC-DRBG is pseudorandom
We formulate the real-world and ideal-world outputs as games involving interactions with the adversary A, and use the code-based game-playing technique [10] to bound the di erence in probability that the adversary returns True. We call this "bounding the distance between the two games." We use "equivalent" to mean that two games correspond to the same probability distribution. We abbreviate "random function" as "RF" and "ideal randomness" as "RB, " for "random bits. " The output block-size of the PRF is denoted by η.
Now we outline the proof of the main result G_real_ideal_close. Here is the proof script: The proof is quite short, since it consists of applying ve lemmas: rewriting G real into the nicer form de ned by G1_prg, then rewriting the ideal-world and real-world games as hybrids, then applying the theorem Gi_adjacent_hybrids_close that bounds the di erence betweeen any two adjacent hybrids by Gi_Gi_plus_1_bound. Most of the work is done in Gi_adjacent_hybrids_close.
Our proof is structured according to this outline, and we will present the lemmas in this order: Gi_Pr_bad_event_collisions 
hybrid_argument
We start by proving a lemma to rewrite G real into a nicer form de ned by G1_prg.
Lemma Generate_move_v_update :
The way NIST's Generate function updates makes it di cult to write neat hybrids. Speci cally, the PRF is re-keyed on the second line of Generate; then, on the next line, in order to update , Generate queries the new PRF. Therefore, if we were to replace f k with a PRF oracle, it would have to span the last line of Generate and the rst two lines of the next Generate call, but not include the second call's -update. This would be messy to reason about. We solve this problem by moving each -update to the beginning of the next call of Generate, then prove that the outputs are still identically distributed. Then, after the PRF is re-keyed, we do not further query it in this call of Generate_v.
In the intermediate game G1_prg, we move each terminalupdate to the beginning of the next call to Generate by splitting the Generate function into Generate_noV and Generate_v.
The function Generate_noV is used for the rst call. It di ers from Generate because it does not start by updating the . The second version, Generate_v, starts by updating and does not update again. Then, as in G real , the resulting list of lists of blocks is passed to the adversary, which returns a boolean guess. This is the revised real-world game that uses the two split-up Generate versions de ned above. To prove the real-world game G real equivalent to the new version G1_prg, we prove that the pseudorandom output produced by this sequence of calls
is identically distributed to the pseudorandom output produced by this new sequence of calls [Generate_noV , Generate_v, Generate_v, . . .].
Using G1_prg, to set up the hybrid argument, we rewrite the two "endpoint" games as hybrids. We rst prove (by a straightforward induction) that the real-world game is equal to the rst hybrid. Next: the ideal-world game is equal to the last hybrid, also proved by a straightforward induction. Bounding the di erence between adjacent hybrids. As described in Section 4.3, the di erence between any two adjacent hybrids is de ned to be the sum of the maximum PRF advantage over the PRF advantage for each hybrid, plus an upper bound on the probability of collisions in a list of length blocksPerCall of uniformly randomly sampled blocks of length η each. The game Gi_prg i de nes the ith hybrid game, which replaces the output of the PRF with ideal randomness for any call before the ith call. To do this, Gi_prg i uses an oracle choose_Generate i that tracks the number of calls callsSoFar (in addition to the PRG's internal state (k, )) and returns the appropriate version of the PRG for that call. choose_Generate i returns Generate_rb_intermediate if the call index is less than i, and Generate_noV or Generate_v as appropriate otherwise. The two quantities that compose the bound between any two adjacent hybrids Gi_prg i and Gi_prg (i + 1) are de ned as follows (see also Section 4.3). To bound the distance between adjacent hybrids Gi_pr i and Gi_pr (i + 1), we derive the two quantities in the bound in two steps. PRF_Advantage_Max is derived in lemma Gi_prf_rf_close, and Pr_collisions in lemma Gi_rf_rb_close.
Before we can derive the bound, we rst need to transform our normal hybrid de nition Gi_prg i into the equivalent oracle-using de nition Gi_prf i. The only di erence between the two de nitions is that Gi_prf i is written in the form of an oracle computation that uses a provided oracle on the ith call. In the new game, the oracle we provide is the PRF, de ned in the code as f _oracle f k. The old game Gi_pr i already uses the PRF on the ith call by de nition. The computation PRF_Adversary is a constructed adversary against the PRF that rewrites our PRG execution, previously de ned using oracleMap, in terms of oracleCompMap, which is a version of oracleMap that replaces the PRF on the ith call of hybrid i with a provided oracle. The provided oracle is the PRF, f _oracle f k. The technical lemma Gi_normal_prf_eq allows us to provide di erent oracles to the new oracle-taking form of the hybrid to use on its ith call, which we use to de ne the two intermediate hybrids after Gi_prg i.
We derive the rst quantity used in the bound, PRF_Advantage_Max.
Recall that we have just rewritten the ith hybrid Gi_prg i as Gi_prf, de ned above, which uses the PRF oracle f _oracle f k. In Gi_rf, we replace the PRF oracle with a random function oracle randomFunc. A random function is simply a function that, queried with any new input, returns an ideally random Bvector η and caches the result. If it is queried with a previous input, it returns the previouslysampled bit-vector. By the de nition of PRF advantage, for any adversary against the PRF, the probability that the adversary can distinguish between the PRF and a random function is PRF_Advan-tage_Game(i), which is upper-bounded by the maximum taken over i (over all hybrids).
Having bounded the distance between Gi_prg i and the intermediate hybrid Gi_rf i, we proceed to derive the second quantity in the bound: the distance between Gi_rf i and the next normal hybrid Gi_prg (i + 1) is Pr_collisions. Similarly to lemma Gi_prf_rf_close, we must rst rewrite the leftmost hybrid Gi_prg (i +1) in the form of the oracle-using hybrid Gi_rb that uses an oracle rb_oracle on its ith call. This new oracle rb_oracle returns an ideally random Bvector η for every query, not caching any of its queried inputs.
Definition rb_oracle (state : list (Blist * Bvector η)) (input : Blist) := output <-$ ({0,1}^eta); ret (output, (input, output) :: state).
We prove this rewrite, Gi_normal_rb_eq, via another induction. We use this rewrite to bound the di erence between the two oracleusing hybrids Gi_rf i and Gi_rb i. The two games di er in only one aspect: on the ith call, Gi_rf i replaces the PRF with a random function oracle, whereas Gi_rb i replaces the PRF with an ideally random oracle. These two oracles themselves can be distinguished by an adversary in only one way: if the random function is queried with an input that has been previously queried, then it becomes deterministic and returns the same output as before, whereas the ideally random oracle will still return ideally random output.
Therefore, the distance between Gi_rf i and Gi_rb i ought to be bounded by the probability that there are duplicates in the inputs to the random function, which we refer to as the probability of the bad event occurring. The probability that the adversary can distinguish between Gi_rf i and Gi_rb i should then be upper-bounded by the probability of the bad event.
We formalize this intuitive argument by applying the fundamental lemma of game-playing [10] , which states that the di erence between two games that are "identical until bad" is upper-bounded by the probability of the "bad event" happening. Two games are "identical until bad" if they are syntactically identical except for statements that follow the setting of a ag bad to true.
We state the bound on the di erence between the game in a form following that of the fundamental lemma: The new games Gi_rf_dups_bad and Gi_rb_bad are just versions of the original games rewritten to return a tuple, where the rst element is the usual output of Gi_rf or Gi_rb and the second event is a boolean that indicates whether the bad event has occurred. To apply the fundamental lemma to prove Gi_rb_rf_identical_until_bad, we rst prove that the games Gi_rf_dups_bad and Gi_rb_bad are indeed identical until bad. First we prove that the bad event has the same probability of happening in each game: This is clearly true (but don't take our word for it: ask Coq!). Second, we prove that if the bad event does not happen, the two games have identically distributed outputs (evalDist takes a Comp and produces the corresponding probability mass function).
Lemma Gi_rb_rf_no_bad_same : forall (i: nat) (a: bool), evalDist (Gi_rb_bad i) (a, false) == evalDist (Gi_rf_dups_bad i) (a, false).
This, too, is clearly true. Thus, we can apply the fundamental lemma to derive the upper bound:
That concludes the identical-until-bad argument, which bounded the di erence between the two games by the probability of the bad event. We nish the proof of the main result by calculating an upper bound on the probability of the bad event, which is, again, a collision in the inputs to the RF. On the ith call to the PRG, the provided oracle (here the random function) is queried once with a constant and then blocksPerCall times after that, where each RF input is actually a previous output from the RF due to the design of HMAC-DRBG's Gen_loop. If an RF output is not a duplicate, it is ideally random. (To derive a more general bound, blocksPerCall can be generalized to the ith element in the request list. The rest of the proof is unchanged.) Therefore, the probability of collisions in the inputs to the RF simpli es to the probability of collisions in a list of length blocksPerCall+ 1 of elements Bvector η that are each sampled uniformly at random. By the union bound, this is less than (1 + blocksPerCall) 2 /2 η .
We have bounded the distance between adjacent hybrids with Gi_adjacent_hybrids_close, so we conclude the whole proof by applying the hybrid argument (which is essentially the triangle inequality, repeatedly applied) with that lemma to bound the distance between the rst and last hybrid. This generic theorem states that if the distance between adjacent games G i and G (i + 1) is bounded by the rational number bound, the di erence between the rst hybrid G 0 and the last hybrid G n is bounded by n · bound.
Coq-speci c proofs
Working in Coq requires doing many proofs of program and game equivalence. These program equivalence proofs are generally elided, by choice or by accident, in paper proofs. Two such proofs are Gi_prog_equiv_prf_oracle and Gi_prog_equiv_rb_oracle. Because using oracles changes the types of all computations that use that computation, the types of Gen_loop, Generate_v, choose_Generate, and oracleMap all change from Comp to OracleComp, and we write new functions with the new type and prove them each equivalent. Proving the two lemmas requires doing complex inductions over both the list of blocks provided by the adversary and over each number of blocks in a call.
Semiformal crypto proofs (e.g., [24] ) often leave the burden of checking for semantic equivalence on the reader. An unintentional error in this part of a crypto proof is unlikely, but an intentional error is possible, and it may be subtle enough that a standards body would not notice it.
E ciency of adversary
We do not formally prove the e ciency of the constructed adversaries in the proof. It is necessary to inspect the family of constructed adversaries (that is, De nition PRF_Adversary in §3.1) in order to establish that it is probabilistic polynomial time; which clearly it is (assuming the adversary against the PRG is p.p.t.). While this omission increases the amount of code that must be inspected, it also allows the result to be interpreted in any model of computation and cost.
CONCRETE SECURITY ESTIMATE
The distance between G real and G ideal is
What does that mean concretely about an adversary's ability to predict the output of HMAC-DRBG? Let us assume the adversary runs in time and space at most 2 t .
Beringer et al. proved that the PRF advantage for HMAC is the sum of the advantages associated with these three assumptions: (1) SHA-256 is weakly collision-resistant, (2) the SHA-256 compression function is a PRF, and (3) the dual family of the SHA256 compression function is a PRF against a (very) restricted related-key attack.
(1) If the best method for nding collisions is a birthday attack, a collision will be found with probability at most 2 2t −256 . (2) If the best method for distinguishing SHA-256's compression from a random function is an exhaustive search on keys, the probability of success is at most 2 t −256 . (3) If, in addition, we consider that the constructed adversary in the proof gains little or no additional advantage from the related key oracle, then the probability of success is at most 2 t −256 [9] .
From these assumptions, we can conclude that the adversary's advantage in distinguishing HMAC-SHA256 from a random function is at most 2 2t −256 + 2 t −255 . For t = 78, the advantage is at most 2 −100 + 2 −177 .
Assuming there are 2 48 calls to the DRBG with block length η = 128 and blocksPerCall = 10, then the distance is about 2 48 · (2 −100 + 2 −177 + (1 + 10) 2 /2 128 , or about 2 −52 . That is, the adversary with a thousand million terabytes (< 2 78 bits), and a million 1gigahertz processors running for a year (< 2 78 cycles) has a 2 −52 chance of guessing better than random.
It also means that block length 128 is better than 64, but increases beyond that are not particularly useful.
Warning: These calculations are based on unproved assumptions (1)(2)(3) about SHA-256 and the best ways to crack it. The assumptions may not be true, and there may be better ways to crack SHA-256.
MBEDTLS IMPLEMENTATION IS CORRECT 6.1 Functional speci cation program
We verify the mbedTLS implementation of HMAC-DRBG with respect to a functional program in Coq, with functions mbedtls_ generate, . . . , mbedtls_reseed. Where the Coq functions Generate, etc. described in Section 4.2 operate over Bvector η, these functions operate over nite lists of sequences of integers (type list Z in Coq), and over abstract DRBG states of type The functions' de nitions are structured in accordance with NIST 800-90A, specialising generic DRBG functions to the functional program for HMAC-SHA256 from Beringer et al. [11] . The detailed de nitions are available in our source code. There is a straightforward relation ∼ between states (k, ) from Section 4 and states (HMAC256DRBGabs k 0 0 false 2 48 ) of our mbedtls functional speci cation.
Based on ∼, we formulate an equivalence theorem between the two speci cations of the Generate function, under certain conditions. For example, mbedTLS measures out_len in bytes, up to 1024, while our crypto spec measures n in 256-bit blocks; the reseed counter must be less than the reseed interval; the predictionResistance ag must be false, and so on. T 6.1. The functions mbedtls_generate, etc. are equivalent to Generate, etc., for ∼ similar states.
P
. By induction on iterations of the Generate loop.
Proving the C program correct w.r.t. the functional program, then proving Theorem 6.1, is simpler than directly proving the C program implements the crypto spec. There are other advantages too: mbedtls_generate is directly executable, though about a million times slower than the C program. Successfully validating our functional program against all 240 noReseed-noPredictionResistance test vectors from NIST [31] takes about 30 mins.
Veri cation of C code
The Veri ed Software Toolchain's program logic, called Veri able C, is a higher-order impredicative separation logic [5] . That is, it is a Hoare logic that can handle advanced features such as pointer data structures, function-pointers, quanti cation over predicates, recursive predicates, and so on. Its judgments take the shape of a Hoare triple {pre(z)}c{post (z)}, where assertions pre(.) and post (.) are predicates on states. Variable z is implicitly universally quanti ed and is used to express functional correctness properties in which postconditions refer to (some aspects of) preconditions. Our proof automation operates over assertions of the form
where P is a purely propositional term, L describes the content of local and global variables, and R describes the content of the heap, as a list of formulae that are implicitly interpreted to refer to non-overlapping memory regions. Figure 1 shows a speci cation of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random. It means, suppose the function is called with argument p_rng holding a concrete representation of some abstract DRBG state I , and output pointing to a (separate) memory region of length 0 ≤ n ≤ 1024, speci ed in out_len. Suppose further that requesting n bytes from I and entropy stream s succeeds according to the functional specication program mbedtls_generate, yielding (bytes,ss, F). Then, executing the body of the C function is safe: it will not perform memory loads or stores outside the region speci ed by the precondition's SEP clause, the function's stack frame, and potentially locally allocated memory; it will not experience division-by-zero or other runtime errors. If terminating, the function will yield return value 0, and a state in which ctx indeed holds abstract state F , output indeed holds bytes, and the entropy stream is updated as speci ed.
The use of representation predicate AREP to relate an abstract DRBG state to a concrete C data structure laid out in memory is typical in separation logic, and emphasizes that client code should only operate on DRBG contexts using the interface functions. Abstract states I and F are elements of the type hmac256drbgabs de ned above. The de nition of AREP includes numeric invariants asserting that, e.g., reseedCounter is bounded between 0 and Int.max_signed, but is only unfolded in the proofs of the function bodies.
The code of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random invokes the more general function mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add, our specication of which indeed supports the supply of additional input, respects the prediction resistance ag and reseeds the DRBG if necessary. The speci cation shown in Figure 1 restricts input arguments so that certain error cases are avoided; again, our formalization also includes more general speci cations.
Our C implementation is based on mbedTLS hmac_drbg.c, specialized to HMAC-SHA256 by instantiating C preprocessor macros. We make minor local edits to satisfy Veri able C's syntactic restrictions: isolating memory loads/stores into separate assignment statements. The program uses a volatile keyword to prevent the C compiler from deleting the clearing of an array after its last use; reasoning about volatile is not supported in Veri able C, so we had to remove it. Calls to HMAC are rerouted to the OpenSSL implementation [11] .
To formally prove that the C code satis es the speci cation, we use the VST-Floyd proof automation system: a collection of Coq tactics, lemmas, and auxiliary de nitions that perform forward symbolic execution with substantial interactive help from the user, who supplies function speci cations, loop invariants, and proofs of application-speci c transformations using Coq's built-in proof commands. Building on the veri cation of HMAC_SHA256, we have speci ed and proved all core functions in hmac_drbg.c, including the ag update functions.
LESSONS LEARNED
Three NIST design decisions made the proof harder or easier.
The good. NIST re-keys the PRF with a length-extended input. This simpli es the component of the proof that bounds the probability of collisions in inputs to the random function. Because HMAC can take inputs of any length, and all previous inputs for HMAC with that key were of xed length (since HMAC has a xed output), it is easy to prove that the length-extended input cannot be a duplicate of any previous input to the random function.
The bad. In Instantiate, NIST begins the initialization of the state (k, ) as follows:
If we assume that entropy_input is ideally random, then it would be better to incorporate it into the rst argument (c 1 ) of HMAC, rather than the second, because the latter forces us to assume or prove that HMAC is an entropy extractor.
If entropy_input is not ideally random (as would likely be the case in a real system), then we will indeed need an entropy extractor. HMAC seems to be as good a candidate as any. However, existing proofs of HMAC as a randomness extractor [19, 21, 27] are only for keys c 1 that are random, so they may not apply here because HMAC-DRBG's c 1 = 0. So we have no security proof of Instantiate. Instead, we assume that the (k, ) produced by Instantiate is ideally random.
The ugly. It is hard to reason about NIST's decision to update the PRG's internal state vector immediately after re-keying the PRF in the same call to Generate. This decision makes it di cult to de ne hybrids that replace a PRF on each call, since the PRF changes and is used before a call is over. We solve this problem by moving each -update to the beginning of the next call and proving that the new sequence of programs is indistinguishable to the adversary, and we continue the proof with the rewritten Generate.
How veri cation helped. The process of mechanizing our proof and working in Coq and FCF enabled us to state de nitions, functions, and games in a language that was expressive, precise, and executable. This bene ted our proof in two main ways.
First, working in this environment prevented us from making subtle mistakes in dealing with a tricky hybrid argument. For example, for every lemma bounding the di erence between adjacent hybrids H i and H i+1 , Coq requires the lemma to be parametrized by i. This helped early in the proof; it forced us to realize that there were multiple PRF adversaries: one for each hybrid H i .
Additionally, Coq prevented us from making suble o -by-one errors in the hybrid argument. It's easy to mix up the total number of hybrids for a list of blocks of n elements-is it n or n + 1 hybrids? It's also easy to mix up whether the oracle is replaced in the ith call or the i + 1th call. If the numbering is wrong, the relevant lemmas will become unprovable.
Second, working in this environment allowed us to "execute" computations in lemmas and test if they held true on small examples, which helped us spot typos in the proof. For example, in Gener-ate_v, we had typed ret (bits, (k , )) instead of ret (bits, (k , )), which made one lemma unprovable until we xed it. Similar bugs have been found in real-world code because a typo or mistake rendered the code unveri able.
The trusted base. As explained in §1, a key part of the trusted base of any machine-checked proof is the statement of the theorem and assumptions. Our theorem is stated as 200 lines of Coq, (pseudorandom properties of HMAC-DRBG), on top of about 50 lines of supporting FCF de nitions de ning the notions of pseudorandomness, etc. We rely on assumptions related to collision-resistance of SHA [11, §4.2] , which means that the 169-line de nition of SHA in Coq is also part of the trusted base.
On the other hand, the de nitions of the HMAC function, the HMAC-DRBG function, and the speci cations of internal APIs need not be trusted, because we prove an end-to-end theorem that, regardless of what these functions actually are, they are correctly implemented by the C code and they correctly provide a PRF.
Proof e ort. The proof of cryptographic security spans about 4500 lines of Coq code-which need not be trusted because it is checked by machine, but still it has a pleasantly clear structure as explained in §4.4. Developing and mechanizing this proof took about 5 personmonths. The C program-correctness proof is about 10,200 lines of Coq, and took 1 person-month by a new user of Veri able C. Theorem 6.1 (about 700 lines), along with the connection to the HMAC proofs and other con guration engineering (included in the 10,200 lines) took about 1 person-month. Coq checks all the proofs in about 16.5 minutes (running Coq 8.6 on a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i7 on a single core; faster on multicore).
FUTURE WORK
In this work we focused primarily on the pseudorandomness property of the DRBG. In SP 800-90A, NIST proposes a variety of additional properties, including "backtracking resistance" and "prediction resistance." The former property ensures that a compromise of generator state should not a ect the security of output generated prior to the compromise, while the latter property addresses post-compromise security (under the assumption of a continually reseeded generator). Extending our proof to backtracking resistance should be straightforward. A proof that HMAC-DRBG is predictionresistant would require a careful speci cation of the rate at which new entropy must be provided.
Our security proof leaves out some optional parameters such as the personalization nonce and additional input. We hope to address these in the future.
While we have addressed only a single NIST DRBG construction, future work may prove the security of other widely-used SP 800-90A constructions such as CTR-DRBG and HASH-DRBG (based on block ciphers and hash functions respectively). These generators have similar constructions to HMAC-DRBG, and thus it is likely that our work may be adapted with reasonable modi cations.
HMAC-DRBG's Instantiate function uses HMAC with xed nonrandom key as a randomness extractor; this is not known to be sound (see §7).
Concerning implementation correctness, we would like to extend our framework by integrating provable protection against sidechannel attacks [3, 7] , including protection against timing attacks that recently a ected implementations of MEE-CBC [2] .
We hope this work will lead to formal veri cation e orts on other widely used cryptographic software packages. Ideally, this type of veri cation could replace or supplement the use of test vectors, which are currently used by organizations such as the U.S. Cryptographic Module Validation Program to validate DRBG correctness.
CONCLUSION
We have created the rst end-to-end formal security-and-correctness veri cation of a real-world random number generator, and the rst machine-checked proofs of HMAC-DRBG security and of a correct implementation of HMAC-DRBG. We can say with very high con dence that HMAC-DRBG and its mbedTLS implementation are secure in their basic functions against a nonadaptive adversary. There are no bugs (including bu er overruns) and no backdoors, purposeful or otherwise. We have not proved security of the Instantiate algorithm (though we have proved that mbedTLS implements it correctly). Our proof is modular; thus, it is portable to other implementations of HMAC-DRBG. Our proof should be extensible to other features and properties of HMAC-DRBG, with limitations as discussed in §8.
Machine-checked proofs of cryptographic security should be a required part of the NIST standardization process. This would likely have detected serious generator aws such as those that occurred in Juniper NetScreen devices [15] . And though HMAC-DRBG is a good DRBG, proving the security of the construction at NIST standardization time would likely have resulted in a more elegant construction, and would have allowed NIST to clearly specify the security assumptions on HMAC required by Instantiate.
Finally, implementations of cryptographic standards should come with machine-checked proofs of correctness. This would have prevented the HeartBleed bug, and probably prevented the Debian/OpenSSL asco (see the appendix).
